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We examine whether Swiss federal fiscal policy was sustainable over the period from 1900 to 
2002. We perform unit root and cointegration tests for federal revenues and expenditures, 
taking into account a structural shift in the budgetary process related to World War II. We 
find sustainability over the entire period. However, splitting the sample into two sub-samples 
before and after World War II, the results do much less support sustainability. Finally, 
applying the tax smoothing model of BARRO (1979), we show that cyclical fluctuations of 
the output and changes in expected inflation rate are major determinants of the federal budget 
deficit over the time period considered. 
JEL Code: H62, H63. 
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The recent deterioration of the fiscal position of governments in several European countries 
and the U.S. has drawn attention to the long run fiscal sustainability of public finance. Several 
theoretical approaches have been developed to analyse whether the government can manage 
the budget deficit in the long run. The seminal paper by DOMAR (1944) does not use the term 
sustainability but implicitly defines it as a constant long run relation between total public debt 
and GDP: public debt may grow but it should not grow faster than GDP. This allows for a 
permanent public deficit, but it should also not grow faster than GDP. 
While DOMAR (1944) considers the steady state long run equilibrium, more recent approaches 
look at the intertemporal budget constraint. The rather popular Generational Accounting Ap-
proach introduced by AUERBACH, GOKHALE and KOTLIKOFF (1991, 1992) defines it in terms 
of net fiscal burden of current and future generations. This implies that fiscal policy is sus 
tainable whenever the net debt of the government does not exceed the sum of the discounted 
net taxes which should be paid by current and future generations.
1) 
Another concept which is more closely related to DOMAR (1944) defines fiscal policy as sus 
tainable if the present value budget constraint of the government is valid: the discounted value 
of public debt should converge to zero at the limit. This implies that current and discounted 
future surpluses must be sufficient to payoff the current public debt. Following this view, sev 
eral econometrical tests developed in the empirical literature. One line proposes that the sta 
tionarity of the public debt indicates the long run sustainability of the fiscal policy. Assuming 
constant interest rates, HAMILTON and FLAVIN (1986) test for the stationarity of undiscounted 
public debt and show that the U.S. fiscal policy is consistent with the present value budget 
constraint. If the discounted debt series is used, WILCOX (1989), however, shows that U.S. 
fiscal policy violates the intertemporal budget constraint. Another direction taken in the em 
pirical literature which uses modern time series methods assumes sustainability to be given 
when the budget deficit and public debt are co integrated. MCDONALD (1992) employs such a 
co integration test and shows that U.S. fiscal policy is not sustainable. An alternative frame 
work implies that fiscal policy is sustainable if government revenues and expenditures are co 
integrated with a co integrating vector [1  1]. TREHAN and WALSH (1988), HAUG (1995), 
AHMEND and ROGERS (1995), and QUINTOS (1995) test for sustainability by checking for the 
co integration between the government revenues and expenditures and show that the U.S. 
federal budget deficit is not sustainable. Furthermore, they find that recent changes in the 
structure of fiscal policy had a significant effect on sustainability of the U.S. federal finance. 
Several studies find structural breaks in the U.S. federal deficit in the mid seventies or early 
eighties which had a significant impact on budget sustainability.
2) QUINTOS (1995), e.g., finds 
                                                           
  1.  A similar approach has been proposed by BLANCHARD et al. (1990) and BLANCHARD (1993) and is em 
ployed by the OECD. See, e.g., OECD (2002). 
  2.  See, e.g., HAMILTON and FLAVIN (1986), WILCOX (1989), HAKKIO and RUSH (1991) as well as QUINTOS, 
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that legislative tax changes in the U.S. in the early eighties like, e.g., the Kemp Roth tax cut, 
had a significant impact on the sustainability of the federal budget deficit. Splitting the sample 
into two sub periods and assuming that there was a structural shock in the early eighties, she 
shows that the U.S. federal budget deficit was sustainable during the pre break period but 
violates the intertemporal budget constraint in the post break sub period. 
While the Generational Accounting Approach has been applied to Swiss data,
3) this paper is 
the first one to use time series methods to test for sustainability of the Swiss fiscal policy. We 
consider the period from 1900 to 2002 and ask whether fiscal policy was consistent with the 
intertemporal budget constraint. However, due to the long time horizon it is necessary to take 
into account possible structural changes in the fiscal policy due to, e.g., the World Wars, the 
Great Depression, and legislative changes in the budgetary process etc. Thus, we look for 
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Figure 1:   Swiss federal expenditure and deficit in relation to GNP, 1900 – 2002 
That fiscal sustainability may also be a Swiss problem can be seen from a visual examination 
of the historical development over the last 100 years. Figure 1 shows federal expenditure and 
deficit over the period 1900 2002. The fiscal position of the federal government worsened 
substantially during both World Wars. However, the upward spike in the deficit is much more 
pronounced during World War II. After this war, expenditure (as a share of GNP) increased 
considerably, while the deficit did not show a clear picture. The development of the federal 
debt, as shown in Figure 2, on the other hand, gives a clearer picture. After the war public 
                                                           
  3.  See, e.g., BORGMAN and RAFFELHÜSCHEN (2004) or KOMMISSION FÜR KONJUNKTURFRAGEN (2004). – 3 – 
 
debt which was accumulated during the war declined until the mid sixties, and then increased 
again, especially during the nineties. The nominal federal public debt increased from 38.5 
billion CHF in 1990 to 122.9 billion CHF in 2002, which implies an increase of 173 percent if 
measured in real terms. As a consequence, the Swiss constitution was amended by a debt bra 
ke through a referendum in December 2001, which is planned to become fully effective from 
2007  onwards,  and  which  –  somewhat  simplified  –  is  operating  in  the  following  way:
4) 
Expenditure have to be adjusted to the revenue which, however, is smoothed over the busi 
ness cycle. In calculating this smoothed revenue extraordinary revenue is not considered; it 
has to be used to pay back debt. ‘Normal’ surpluses and deficits are accounted in a separate 
account and they are to be balanced over several years. Deficits which exceed 6 percent of the 
expenditure of the preceding year have to be balanced within the next three years. Extraordi 
nary expenditure (which are not included in these calculations) can be decided on by the ma 
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Figure 2:   Swiss federal debt in relation to GNP, 1900 – 2002 
The fact that not only this new instrument has been introduced but that a huge majority of 
84.7 percent of the people voted in favour of this amendment indicates that at least the Swiss 
population had doubts about the sustainability of its federal fiscal policy. Moreover, the gen 
erational accounting analyses for Switzerland mentioned above clearly demonstrate the exis 
tence of a sustainability gap. The problem of these analyses is, however, that they use ex 
                                                           
  4.  See also DANNINGER (2002) and – for more details – the legal documents: Bundesbeschluss über eine 
Schuldenbremse vom 22. Juni 2001 (BBl 2000, 4653) as well as Änderung des Bundesgetzes über den eid 
genössischen  Finanzhaushalt  vom  22.  Juni  2001  (BBl  2000,  4728f.,  Entwurf.).  See  for  this  also:  EID 
GENÖSSISCHES FINANZDEPARTEMENT (2001) as well as BUNDESRAT (2000, 2001). – 4 – 
 
trapolations of the current situation and do not take into account that the current situation may 
not be an equilibrium. Consequently, starting with different base years the estimated sustain 
ability gap may be quite different. The econometric approaches, on the other hand, try to look 
at the underlying long run equilibrium relations and ask whether these relations imply sus 
tainability. The disadvantage is that they might give too little weight to the most recent devel 
opment (and too much to the no longer relevant past). Thus, the two approaches complement 
each other. As generational accounting analyses for Switzerland are available but no econo 
metric analyses of this problem, this paper intends filling this gap. 
Thus, with regard to the Swiss fiscal policy, the following two issues are the main concern of 
this study. Firstly, is the Swiss federal budget deficit consistent with the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government? And are there changes in the Swiss fiscal history which might 
fundamentally shift the sustainable deficit process? Secondly, is it possible to explain the 
budget process by macroeconomic factors such as cyclical fluctuations of the economy or 
changes in inflation?   
To answer these questions, we use a set of tests for cointegration between federal revenues 
and expenditures over the period from 1900 to 2002. Searching for structural changes in the 
budgetary process, we employ three different econometric strategies. We apply the PERRON 
(1989) unit root test with unknown structural breaks to the deficit, revenues and expenditures. 
Furthermore, we use the Chow test which examines the stability of the parameters of the 
short run relationship between revenues and expenditures. Additionally, we perform the GRE 
GORY and HANSEN (1996) test in order to check for the presence of structural breaks in the 
log run cointegration relationship between revenues and expenditures. Based on these fin 
dings, we apply the tax smoothing model of BARRO (1979, 1986) in order to analyse the 
macroeconomic determinants of the budgetary process. Foreshadowing our results, we find 
that the budget deficit is weakly sustainable over the entire period. Hence, we show that it 
exhibits a significant structural change during World War II which affected the structure of 
fiscal policy in the post World War II sub period. Splitting the entire sample into two sub 
samples, the results for both sub periods do, however, much less support the assumption of 
sustainability.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the test 
approaches which have been developed. Section 3 contains a discussion of the time series 
properties of the federal budget deficit, revenues and expenditures. Hence it presents and dis 
cusses the results of the unit root tests following the univariate test for sustainability of budget 
deficit, the test for structural breaks, and deals with the tests for co integration between reve 
nues and expenditures. After performing these tests, Section 4 examines the relevant determi 
nants of the federal budget deficit. In Section 5 we finally discuss how the seemingly contra 
dictory results for the entire period and the two sub periods might be interpreted. – 5 – 
 
2  The Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical model of sustainability of budget deficit is based on the static and intertempo 
ral budget constraint of the government. The static budget constraint (in nominal terms) is 
given by 
(1)  Gt  +  (1 + rt) TDt 1   =   Rt  +  TDt , 
where TDt represents the stock of public debt, while rt denotes the ex post interest rate for 
public debt, Rt represents government revenues and Gt expenditures excluding interest pay 
ments (at time t). In order to simplify the model, we do not explicitly consider the revenue 
from seignorage.  
Assuming that equation (1) holds for each period, we obtain the intertemporal budget con 
straint by performing the forward substitution as 
(2)  TDt   =   
n
t n t n
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By assuming a constant interest rate r the present value budget constraint (PVBC) of the gov 
ernment is given by  













+ + →∞ +
. 
Whether fiscal policy is sustainable depends on the development of the second term of this 
equation. If the transversality condition  




+ + →∞ +
   =   0 
holds, the present value budget constraint of the government is given by 









−   +   ∑ . 
Condition (3a) is known as the ‘no Ponzi game’ rule for public debt, it states that the growth 
rate of public debt should not be larger than the real interest rate. Under the usual assumption 
that the real interest rate is larger than the real growth rate of the economy, this is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for fiscal policy to be sustainable.
5) It requires that current and dis 
                                                           
  5.  If the real growth rate is larger than the real interest rate, (3a) it is sufficient but not necessary for fiscal 
policy to be sustainable. Following the (implicit) DOMAR (1944) definition that fiscal policy is sustainable 
whenever the long run relation between government debt and GDP is constant, the growth rate of public – 6 – 
 
counted future surpluses must be sufficient to pay off the current public debt. If this require 
ment is satisfied then the fiscal policy of the government is consistent with the present value 
budget constraint. 
Several methods have been developed to test whether the fiscal policy of government is sus 
tainable. One direction of the studies checks whether the data are consistent with the transver 
sality condition by examining the stationarity properties of the budget deficit excluding inter 
est payments of public debt. Assuming a constant real interest rate and starting with relation 
(3) as null hypothesis, HAMILTON and FLAVIN (1986) take  






  +  
   =   A0   >   0 
as an alternative. Inserting this into (2a) and rearranging it leads to  












  +   ∑   +   A0 (1 + r)
t  
where St represents the primary surplus. HAMILTON and FLAVIN (1986) argue that a sufficient 
condition for the validity of the present value budget constraint is the stationarity of the pri 
mary deficit. If A0 = 0 in equation (5), then they expect that public debt is stationary. 
Using annual U.S. data for the period from 1962 to 1984, they apply the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test to the budget deficit series and show that the levels of public debt and the primary 
deficit are stationary. Based on these findings, they suggest that the U.S. federal government 
budget is balanced in the present value terms.  
However, there have been raised several critical issues concerning the hypothesis and the re 
sults presented in this study. WILCOX (1989) uses the same data to show evidence that the 
hypothesis developed by HAMILTON and FLAVIN (1986) is incorrect. He demonstrates that the 
present value budget constraint may be satisfied even if the level of the primary deficit is non 
stationary. He uses two lines of arguments. Firstly, he questions the assumption about the 
constant real interest rate. Hence, he modifies the test of HAMILTON and FLAVIN (1986) and 
defines the sustainable budget policy in a way that the discounted value of public debt con 
verges to zero. He allows for a time varying real interest rate, discounts the debt series back to 
the starting period, and applies the ADF test to discounted series. He comes to the conclusion 
that, over the entire period from 1960 to 1982, U.S. fiscal policy is not sustainable, i.e. it vio 
lates the present value budget constraint.
6) Secondly, he asks whether the sustainability of 
fiscal policy exhibits significant structural breaks and splits the sample into two sub samples: 
the pre 1974  and post 1974 sub periods. He finds that fiscal policy of the U.S. federal gov 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
debt may well be higher than the real interest rate whenever the latter is below the long run growth rate of 
the economy. 
  6.  KREMERS (1988, 1989) as well as TREHAN and WALSH (1988) draw similar conclusions.  – 7 – 
 
ernment  was  not  sustainable  in  the  second  sub period,  and  he  points  out  that  non sustai 
nability of the budget deficit came into effect in the latter period. 
An equivalent to HAMILTON and FLAVIN’s (1986) test for intertemporal budget constraint re 
quires a test for co integration between the public debt and budget deficit, given that these 
series are of the same order of integration. In order to derive the testable hypothesis that equa 
tion (3a) holds, MACDONALD (1992) rewrites (3b) as  












  +   ∑  
After rearranging he gets 
(6)  TDt  –  
1
r











   
  +   ∑  
Condition (6) implies that the test for stationarity of  St is equivalent to the test for stationar 
ity of (TDt – St/r). Thus, the sustainability condition requires the cointegration between St and 
TDt with the cointegrating vector [1  r]. To test this hypothesis, MACDONALD (1992) employs 
U.S. quarterly fiscal data for the period of the first quarter of 1951 to the last one of 1984. 
Applying  the  co integration  methods  of  ENGLE  and  GRANGER  (1987)  and  of  JOHANSEN 
(1988), he fails to find evidence for cointegration and concludes that the U.S. budget deficit is 
not consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. Like WILCOX (1989), he assumes the 
presence of structural breaks and performs his analysis also for different sub samples. He 
come to the conclusion that U.S. fiscal policy violates the present value budget constraint in 
the sub samples. The same result was reached by TREHAN and WALSH (1988) with an alterna 
tive test for the intertemporal budget constraint based on the co integration between the defi 
cit and public debt with annual data for the period from 1946 to 1987. 
An alternative is to test for cointegration between revenues and expenditures. HAKKIO and 
RUSH (1991) propose to rewrite equation (2a) with total government expenditure (TG) on the 
left hand side: 
(7)  TGt   =   Gt  +  r TDt 1   =   Rt  +   t n t n n 1
n 1
1










+ + →∞ +
. 
They assume that revenues (R) and expenditures (G) are integrated of order 1, i.e. I(1), so that 
 R and  TG are stationary, and rearrange equation (7) to 




+ + →∞ +
  +  εt . 
Assuming that the second last term in (8) tends at the limit to zero leads to the test equation – 8 – 
 
(9)  Rt   =   α  +  β TGt  +  εt . 
Given that TG and R are both difference stationary, HAKKIO and RUSH (1991) define cointe 
gration between these variables as a necessary condition for the present value budget con 
straint to hold. Furthermore, they show that 0 < β ≤ 1 is a necessary condition for the term in 
(8) to zero.  
To test these hypotheses, HAKKIO and RUSH (1991) use U.S. quarterly data for the period 
from the second quarter of 1950 to the fourth quarter of 1988. They show that revenues and 
expenditures are co integrated, but that the cointegration coefficient β is significantly lower 
than one. Furthermore, they find that the budgetary process exhibits a significant structural 
shift. When using the sample from 1964 to 1988, they show that the federal budget deficit 
violates the present value budget constraint. HAUG (1995) comes to the same conclusion when 
applying the same approach to quarterly data for the period from 1950 to 1990.
7)   
Using a similar methodology, QUINTOS (1995) introduces ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ conditions for 
intertemporal  budget  balance.  Starting  with  regression  equation  (9),  she  defines  that  (i) 
‘strong’ sustainability requires the co integration between expenditures and revenues with the 
co integrating vector [1  1], while ‘weak’ sustainability involves co integration with 0 < ß ≤ 
1; and the budget deficit is not sustainable if ß ≤ 0.  
To show the rational of these conditions, she reformulates equation (3a) in terms of first dif 
ferences as 






    +  
   =   0. 
Assuming a constant interest rate r, and under the condition that  TD is a stationary process, 
she derives the trajectory of the limit term in (10) depending on stochastic characteristics of 
 TD. If this is stationary, the evolution of the term at the limit is given by 
(11) 
n
t t n n E lime TD
−λ
+ →∞
         =  0, 
where λ is a constant (λ ≥ 0). If  TD is nonstationary, then this term can be described by 
(12) 
n
t t n n E lime n TD
−λ
+ →∞
         =   0. 
She shows that the stationarity of  TDt  is a sufficient condition for the term in (10) to go to 
zero. Furthermore, the term in (11) goes faster to zero than the one in (12) when revenues and 
expenditures are not cointegrated. She proposes (11) as the ‘strong’ and (12) as the ‘weak’ 
conditions for fiscal sustainability. As the term in (12) tends slower to zero, QUINTOS (1995) 
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suggests that the ‘strong’ condition for intertemporal budget balance is fulfilled, but that the 
government faces difficulties in managing its debt. When 0 < β < 1, it is a sufficient condition 
for (12) to be valid.  
QUINTOS (1995) starts with regression equation (9) in order to derive a testable hypothesis. 
Given that the residuals from the cointegrating regression are I(0), if the revenues R and ex 
penditures TG are cointegrated, she inserts (9) into the equation (1), and after rearranging she 
obtains the equation of undiscounted public debt as 
(13)   TDt   =   (1 – β) TGt  –  α  –  εt . 
She shows, that if 0 < β <1 in (13),  TD is like TG nonstationary, regardless of whether R 
and TG are cointegrated. Accordingly, both conditions, (i) β = 1 and (ii) cointegration be 
tween R and TG , are together necessary and sufficient for (11) to hold.  
In order to derive the weaker necessary condition for (12), after some rearranging, she re 
writes (10) as 






    +  
 
=   
n j n n
t t j t 1 n 1 n 1 n
j 0
[1 (1 )] [1 (1 )]
E lim S TD
(1 r) (1 r)
−
+ − + + →∞
=
        + −β + −β
  +          
+ +          
∑ , 
where St = (1 – β) Gt – α – εt. For (14) to work like (12), the sufficient and necessary condi-
tions are together, (i) that 0 < β ≤ 1, and (ii), that  TD, while nonstationary, is only mildly 
explosive, given that  S is stationary.
8) Cointegration between revenues and expenditures 
with 0 < β ≤ 1 is only a sufficient condition. If 0 < β < 1, then (12) is valid regardless of 
whether revenues and expenditures are cointegrated, since  TD is nonstationary following 
condition (14). If β = 1, then (11) is satisfied if the revenues and expenditures are cointe 
grated, while (12) is still valid if revenues and expenditures are not cointegrated. 
Using U.S. quarterly data over the period from 1947 to 1992, QUINTOS (1995) finds that 0 < β 
< 1 in the estimated model (9), and concludes that the U.S. budget deficit is ‘weakly’ sustain 
able for the entire sample.
9) Hence, by contrast to the previous studies, she proposes to use an 
alternative stability test to endogenously estimate the breaks in the data to the one proposed 
by HAUG (1992) and finds results which support the conclusions of HAKKIO and RUSH (1991). 
Revenues and expenditures are co integrated with a cointegrating vector [1  1] in the first sub 
period, while 0 < β ≤ 1, but revenues and expenditures are not co integrated, and 0 < β < 1 in 
the second sub period.  
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The discussion of the previous empirical studies suggests that the analysis of sustainability 
produces differing results depending on the methods used. In this study we apply the test for 
cointegration  between  revenues  and  expenditures  in  order  to  test  for  sustainability  of  the 
Swiss federal budget deficit over the period from 1900 to 2002. In doing so, we follow the 
econometric methodology of QUINTOS (1995). We use the definition of strong sustainability 
when the revenues and expenditures are cointegrated with the cointegrating vector [1  1] and 
assume that the budget process is weakly sustainable for 0 < β ≤ 1. Furthermore, since the 
data covers World Wars and the Great Depression, which as exogenous shocks may neverthe 
less be relevant for fiscal sustainability, we adopt tests for co integration which are robust to 
structural breaks. We apply the Chow stability test to estimate structural breaks in the short 
run relationship as proposed by STOCK and WATSON (1993). Hence, additionally, we use the 
modified  cointegration  test  of  GREGORY  and  HANSEN  (1996)  which  allows  for  structural 
breaks in the parameters of the long run relationship. Based on these results, we estimate the 
macroeconomic determinants of the federal budget deficit, following BARRO's (1979, 1986) 
tax smoothing model.   
3  Data, Empirical Methodology, and Results 
To analyse the Swiss federal budget policy we use annual fiscal data of the Swiss Federal 
Government for the period from 1900 to 2002. The data are taken from the Historical Statis 
tics of Switzerland, and from several issues of the Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland and the 
Federal Budget. The data was obtained from the Federal Statistical Office and the Swiss Na 
tional Bank, as well as other complementary sources. The series include federal non interest 
expenditures, interest payments, military and non military expenditures, revenues and federal 
debt,  the  real  gross  national  product  (GNP),  the  GNP  deflator,  the  consumer  price  index 
(CPI), and the money growth aggregate M3. Since the federal budget deficit series which is 
reported in the official statistical sources does not account for interest payments, we made an 
appropriate adjustment of this series to make it consistent with the required theoretical set up. 
The fiscal series considered in this analysis are defined ratios to GNP which are obtained by 
dividing their nominal values by nominal GNP.
10)  
3.1  Results of Stationarity Tests 
We start the empirical analysis by examining the stationarity properties of the federal budget 
deficit, revenues and expenditures by using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the 
Phillips Perron (PP) tests. We also perform the KWIATKOWSKI, PHILLIPS, SCHMIDT, and SHIN 
(KPSS) test which examines the null hypothesis of the stationarity of the time series. The re 
sults are in line with those from the unit root tests. We perform these different procedures 
                                                           
 10.  The sources of the data are given in the Appendix. – 11 – 
 
since their results are rather sensitive to the use of the long run variance estimators if the time 
series are highly autocorrelated.
11) 
Furthermore, PERRON (1989) points out that if a time series is trend stationary but the test 
does not account for the time trend, the test statistics may be inadequately calculated as a re 
sult of the incorrect specification of the model. The visual examination of the data suggests 
the presence of a time trend; consequently we apply unit root and stationarity tests to the vari 
ables in levels and first differences. The results are given in Table 1.  
Moreover, as PERRON (1989) argues, if a time series have a significant break in the trend 
function, the power of the standard unit root tests substantially decreases. To take this into 
account, we split the entire sample into two sub samples, from 1900 to 1939 and from 1946 to 
2002 by eliminating the observations during World War II, and perform unit root and station 
arity tests for the pre  and post World War II sub periods. The results for these two sub 
periods are also given in Table 1.  
The sustainability of budget balance requires the stationarity of the primary budget deficit. 
For the entire sample, the results of the tests favour the stationarity of the deficit GNP ratio: 
the coefficient of the autoregressive term in the ADF regression is  0.233, with a t statistic of 
 3.941. Hence, the result implies that the time series is trend stationary. The findings are quite 
different for the sub periods. Considering the pre 1939 sub period, the tests suggest the non 
stationarity of the deficit GNP ratio: the coefficient of the autoregressive term is  0.140 with a 
t statistic of  1.288. After 1946, the unit root hypothesis is rejected when we use the PP test, 
but it cannot be rejected when we use the ADF  test. These results provide no evidence at all 
for the pre World War II period and only weak evidence for sustainability after World War II. 
This is hardly compatible with the results showing sustainability for the entire period. How 
ever, the failure to reject the null hypotheses for the sub periods might be due to the small 
numbers of observations and the low power of these tests.  
The sustainability test based on the examination of the stationarity properties of the primary 
deficit is equivalent to a test for co integration between revenues and expenditures under the 
condition that these series are of the same order of integration. To examine the stationarity 
properties of the revenue  and expenditure ratios, we perform the same set of tests as con 
ducted before. The results are also given in Table 1. They favour the existence of a unit root 
in the levels of the variables, but indicate stationarity for the first differences. The unit root 
and the stationarity test results for the pre  and post World War II sub periods are consistent 
with the findings related to the budget deficit GNP ratio. The results for the post World War 
II sub period imply trend stationarity of the federal revenue  and expenditure GNP ratios. 
Thus, the next step is to test for a structural break related to World War II. 
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Table 1:   Tests for Unit Roots and Stationarity 





























  1900 – 2002 
Public debt   2.606   2.597   5.888**   1.807   1.788   5.826**  0.296  0.270**  0.115 
Primary deficit   4.425**   4.489**   9.314**   3.456*   3.482*   9.305**  0.112  0.059  0.028 
Total deficit   3.941**   4.009**   9.117**   3.113*   3.140   9.112**  0.150  0.099  0.037 
Revenues   1.115   2.346   6.870**   1.279   2.880   15.380**  1.688**  0.239**  0.050 
Expenditure   2.483   3.173
(*
)   6.267**   2.140   2.693   6.296**  1.009**  0.130
(*
)  0.038 
Military 
expenditure 
 4.218**   4.209**   4.892**   3.124*   3.113   6.778**  0.163  0.160*  0.042 
Civil 
expenditure 
 1.266   3.527*   5.021**   1.131   2.604   9.012**  1.594**  0.107  0.044 
  1900 – 1939 
Public debt   0.947   1.954   3.929**   0.855   1.769   3.930**  0.728*  0.117  0.085 
Primary deficit   1.635   1.518   5.174**   1.806   1.716   5.168**  0.129
(*
)  0.121  0.143 
Total deficit   1.288   1.461   4.980**   1.470   1.692   4.989**  0.178
(*
)  0.121  0.143 
Revenues   0.310   4.035*   9.694**   0.393   4.102*   11.120**  0.853  0.109  0.112 
Expenditure   0.257   1.366   2.901
(*
)   0.373   1.437   2.822
(*
)  0.522  0.098  0.174 
Military 
expenditure 
 2.314   2.179   2.109   1.591   1.582   3.699
(*
)  0.096  0.097  0.158 
Civil 
expenditure 
 0.789   2.485   4.898   1.029   2.357   4.910**  0.719  0.068  0.059 
  1946 – 2002 
Public debt   1.627   2.868   3.798**   3.382*   2.848   6.454**  0.337  0.268**  0.863* 
Primary deficit   2.511   4.388**  11.787**   3.579**   4.537**  12.502**  0.695*  0.086  0.067 
Total deficit   2.223   2.751   11.573**   3.547*   4.271**  12.033**  0.492*  0.078  0.065 
Revenues   1.477   4.613**   4.384**   3.598**   6.482**  12.766**  0.594**  0.227**  0.486* 
Expenditure   1.824   6.631**   9.043**   2.069   7.001**   9.426**  0.845**  0.185*  0.483* 
Military 
expenditure 
0.136   4.781**   5.846**   0.859   3.208
(*
)   7.445**  1.020**  0.085  0.147 
Civil 
expenditure 
 0.151   7.127**   8.411**   1.369   7.606**   8.292**  0.905**  0.173*  0.514* 
All variables are measured in relation to GNP The values are the estimated t statistics.. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘
(*
)’ 
show that the corresponding null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. The 
number of lags of the ADF test has been determined using the Hanna Quinn criterion. For the PP and the 
KPSS tests always 4 lags have been used. 
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We treat the year 1940 as the period that changes the trend function and apply the PERRON 
test to the variables defined in terms of GNP ratios.
12) We estimate three models. Model (A) 
allows for one time shift in the intercept of the trend function and is defined by 
(15)   yt   =   α0  +  α1 yt 1  +  β1  yt 1  +  …  +  βn  yt n  +  γ D(TBt)  +  εt , 
where the dummy variable D(TB) is one for t = 1941 and zero elsewhere.  
Model (B) accounts for the change in the growth rate of the trend function and is defined by  
(16)   yt   =   α0  +  α1 yt 1  +  β1  yt 1  +  …  +  βn  yt n  +  δ DUt  +  εt , 
where the dummy variable DUt = 1 for t > 1940 and zero elsewhere.  
Finally, model (C) allows for a change in the intercept as well as the growth rate: 
(17)   yt   =   α0  +  α1 yt 1  +  β1  yt 1  +  …  +  βn  yt n  +  γ D(TBt)  +  δ DUt  +  εt , 
 
Table 2:   Unit Root Tests with a Structural Break in 1940 
Model A  Model B  Model C 
Variables 
k  ˆ t   k  ˆ t   k  ˆ t  
Public debt  4  –2.164  0  –2.063  0  –2.607 
Revenues  3  –1.308  6  –2.050  3  –1.988 
Expenditure  1  –1. 415  1  –1.888  1  –1.989 
Primary deficit  4  –3.882*  4  –4.045*  4  –3.950 
Total deficit  4  –3.288  4  –3.406  4  –3.694 
All variables are measured in relation to GNP. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘
(*
)’ show that the null hypothesis of no coin 
tegration can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. – k is the number of lags. 
 
The results of the PERRON (1989) test  for the federal budget deficit GNP ratio series given in 
Table 2 indicate that the break in the year 1940 does not produce any significant change in the 
series: the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance. The 
findings for the federal revenue  and expenditure ratios show that after 1940 a significant 
change occurred in the levels and an increase in the slopes.
13)  
                                                           
 12.  The Perron test is also performed for a break point in the year 1946. The results are quite similar. 
 13.  Critical values for the unit root test are from PERRON (1989, 1990) for λ = 0.4, which is the ratio of the 
number of observations in the pre World War II sub period to the total number of observations in the sam 
ple. – 14 – 
 
3.2  Results of Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
Given that the unit root test results for the whole period indicate stationarity of deficit GNP 
ratio, and difference stationarity of the revenue  and expenditure ratios with the same order of 
integration, the next step is to test for co integration between revenues and expenditures. By 
performing this analysis we test two hypotheses: (i) whether the revenue  and expenditure 
GNP ratios are co integrated, and (ii) whether the co integrating vector (excluding the con 
stant term) is close to [1  1]. One possibility is to use the residual based test of ENGLE and 
GRANGER (1987) for co integration, which is based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) re 
siduals  t ˆ ε  from the co integrating regression of model (9). 
 
Table 3:   Results of the Engel-Granger Cointegration Test 
  Cointegrating equation  Residual regression 
Dependent variable   ˆ β  R
2  D. W.  k  ADF 
statistic  PP statistic 
  1900 – 2002 
Expenditure GNP ratio  0.710 
(0.12)  0.364
(*
)  0   3.120
(*
)   3.012
(*
) 





)  0   3.147
(*
)   3.398* 
  1900 – 1913, 1922 – 1939, 1946 – 2002 
Expenditure GNP ratio  0.999 
(0.03)  0.730**  1   3.622*   4.577** 
Revenue GNP ratio  0.927 
(0.03) 
0.927 
0.747**  1   3.380*   4.374** 
  1900 – 1939 
Expenditure GNP ratio  0.498 
(0.10)  0.372
(*
)  0   2.010   1.860 
Revenue GNP ratio  0.817 
((0.16) 
0.408 
0.400*  0   1.403   1.552 
  1946 – 2002 
Expenditure GNP ratio  0.726 
(0.08)  0.964**  2   3.782*   4.967** 
Revenue GNP ratio  1.009 
(0.06) 
0.734 
0.732**  1   2.554   3.587* 
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘
(*
)’ show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10 percent 
level, respectively. – k is the number of lags of the ADF test. 
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The results for the whole period and for the two sub periods are given in Table 3.
14) The 
ADF test gives a t statistic of  3.120, which is significant at the 10 percent level. This indi 
cates that the federal revenue  and expenditure GNP ratios are co integrated when we use the 
full sample. The findings are consistent with the results obtained from unit root tests which 
also point towards the stationarity of fiscal balance GNP ratio in the whole sample. However, 
the Jarque Bera statistics indicate that the residuals are not normally distributed. Excluding 
the years that may be viewed as outliers we check whether the estimated co integrating vector 
is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  prediction.
15)  In  this  case,  the  co integrating  vector  is 
[1  0.999]. This suggests that the federal budget deficit is sustainable over the entire period. 
The results are again different if we look at the two sub periods. In the pre World War II sub 
period, the federal revenue  and expenditure GNP ratios are not co integrated; the t statistic is 
only  2.010. Similar results are obtained from regression of expenditure on the revenue GNP 
ratio: a t statistic of  1.403 is not significant at any conventional level which lends further 
support to the findings of the unit root and stationarity tests. Moreover, the federal budget 
seems not to be balanced in the post World War II sub period. Though the ADF test rejects 
the null hypothesis of non co integration with a t statistic of  3.782 at the 5 percent level, the 
estimated co integrating vector is [1  0.726]. This provides evidence for weak sustainability 
of the budget deficit in the post World War II sub period.  
3.3  Results of Tests for Structural Breaks in the Long-Run Relationship 
To accommodate possible shifts in the parameters of the co integrating vector we follow 
GREGORY and HANSEN (1996) and use the test for stability of the estimated coefficients by 
allowing for a one time structural change in the deficit generating process.  
In order to check the structural breaks, we perform Chow tests for the null hypothesis of a 
constant cointegrating relation against the alternative of different cointegrating vectors in the 
pre and post World War II sub periods. We apply this test to the dynamic ordinary least 
squares regression using two lags and assuming an AR(4) process.
16) The results are shown in 
Figure 3.
 17) They show that the null hypothesis of no break can be rejected at all conventional 
significance levels at several points over World War II sub period.  
                                                           
 14.  Critical values for the ADF test are taken from MACKINNON (1991) and for the Durbin Watson statistic 
from ENGLE and GRANGER (1987). In order to provide the robustness analysis of the estimated model (9), 
we also performed reversed regressions. The results are given in the second part of Table 5. 
 15.  We exclude the years 1919 to 1921 as well as 1939 to 1946 from the sample. 
 16.  See for this STOCK and WATSON (1993). Using a similar test, HAKKIO and RUSH (1991) and HAUG (1995) 
show that the structural break points have a significant effect on the sustainability of the U.S. federal 
budget deficit. QUINTOS (1995) arrives at the same conclusion by applying the modified Wald test. 
 17.  Following the suggestion of ANDREWS (1993) we perform the tests only for the trimmed sample by elimi 
nating the initial and the final 15 percent.   – 16 – 
 
Based on this evidence, in the following analysis we treat World War II as a shock which sig 
nificantly changes the parameters of the co integrating regression. To examine the question of 
whether this break point has a significant effect on the intertemporal budget balance, we per 
form the GREGORY and HANSEN (1996) modified co integration test. This evidence concerns 
the properties of the cointegrating residuals which are different for the pre  and post World 
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Figure 3:   Values of the chi-squared test for parameter stability in the cointegrating vector 
GREGORY and HANSEN (1996) offer three models that allow for correcting the co integrating 
relationships in the presence of structural break points. Assuming a break point in the year 
1940, the first model (A) which accounts for the level shift in the co integrating relationships 
is given by  
(18)  Rt   =   α  +  β1 TGt  +  β2 DUt  +  εt , 
where the dummy variable DUt = 1 for t > 1940 and zero elsewhere.  
The second model (B) includes the time trend and accounts for the change in the slope  
(19)  Rt   =   α  +  β1 TGt  +  β2 DUt  +  β3 Time  +  εt , 
where additionally Time is included which denotes a time trend. 
Finally, a third model (C) allows for a regime shift in the co integrating relationships  
(20)  Rt   =   α  +  β1TGt  +  β2 DUt  +  β3 (DUt   TGt)  +  εt , – 17 – 
 
where (DU   TG) represents a regime shift in the deficit generating process. In a second step, 
we apply the ADF test to the residuals from each of the estimated co integrating models (18) 
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Figure 4: Test statistics if the ADF-test for cointegration between federal revenue- 
and expenditures-GNP ratios 
Figure  4  depicts  the  ADF(τ) statistics  of  the  residuals  from  each  of  three  estimated  co 
integrating models (20) to (22) by treating each year in the interval [(0.15T),(0.85T)] as a 
break point. The figure illustrates that the significant ADF values are estimated for several 
break  points during the pre World War II sub period: these findings confirm the assumption 
of non sustainability of budget deficit over this time period. Hence, this figure provides evi 
dences for several significant break points in the post World War II sub period.  
3.4  Results of Johansen Cointegration Test 
In addition to the ADF test, we also use the JOHANSEN (1988) multivariate cointegration test 
in order to determine the number of co integrating vectors in the system. We perform the 
trace test and as well as the maximum eigenvalue test, and we assume that there is a constant 
in the error correction term. The lag length of the VAR is selected by using the Schwarz crite 
rion. Critical values are taken from OSTERWALD LENUM (1992). 
Table 4 shows the results for the entire sample and for the two sub periods from 1900 to 1939 
and from 1946 to 2002. These results support the hypothesis of co integration between reve – 18 – 
 
nues and expenditures as shares of GNP, with a co integrating vector of [1  1.045] for the 
entire sample; these findings are economically reasonable. 
 
Table 4:   Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test 







1900 – 2002 
0.214  r  =  0  4  27.91**  23.70** 
0.042  r  =  1  4  4.21  4.21 
[1.0     0.005   –1.045] 
1900 – 1939 
0.215  r  =  0  1  11.96  9.21 
0.069  r  =  1  1  2.74  2.74 
[1.0   –0.000   –1.070] 
1946 – 2002 
0.497  r  =  0  4  40.74**  39.20** 
0.026  r  =  1  4  1.54  1.54 
[1.0   –0.020   –0.783] 
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘
(*
)’ show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 0.1, 1, 5, or 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 
The evidence for the sub periods is also in line with the previous results. The shares of reve 
nues  and  expenditures  of  GNP ratios  are  co integrated  with  a  cointegrating  a  vector  of 
[1  0.783] for the post World War II sub period. The χ
2 test statistics of the hypothesis that 
the co integrating vector is [1  1] is 0.22 with a p value of 0.63. It is also quite close to the 
estimated coefficient  ˆ β  = 0.726 in the static regression of the ENGLE and GRANGER (1987) 
test.  
Taking  all  results  together,  the  federal  budget  deficit  is  consistent  with  the  intertemporal 
budget constraint over the entire period where the share of the primary deficit of GNP is sta 
tionary, and, hence, federal revenues and expenditures are cointegrated with a cointegrating 
vector close to [1  1]. When using the two sub samples, the results show that the intertempo 
ral budget constraint is violated for the pre World War II period, while the weak sustainability 
condition may hold in the post World War II period.   
4   Determinants of the Federal Budget Deficit 
In this section we focus on the main determinants of the federal budget deficit. This question 
translates into testing whether the federal budget deficit can be explained by macroeconomic 
factors such as expected inflation, the cyclical position of the economy which influences tax 
revenues and temporary changes in the structure of federal expenditures. Following the theo 
retical approach of the tax smoothing model of BARRO (1979, 1986), we analyze whether the – 19 – 
 
above mentioned factors which explain the federal budget deficit in Switzerland in the post 
war period differ significantly from those during the World Wars.  
The tax smoothing approach models the budget deficit as a linear function of the variations of 
the expected rate of inflation, the temporary fluctuations of the government expenditures dur 
ing wartime,
18) cyclical fluctuations of the output during the economic booms and the reces 
sions.
19) We extend this model to the following system of equations  
(21)  Dt   =   α  +  β1
e
t π   +  β2 TDt +  β3 RGNPt  +  β4 RMGt  +  β5 Dt 1  +  εt,  
(22)  πt   =   γ0  +  γ1 πt 1  +  γ2 πt 2  +  γ3 m3r,t 1  +  γ4 gnpr,t 1  +  γ5 gnpr,t 1  +  ηt . 
In this model D is the nominal federal budget deficit divided by the nominal GNP, π
e repre 
sents expected inflation TD is the nominal federal debt divided by the nominal GNP, RGNP is 
a measure of temporary output fluctuations, i.e. the output gap, RMG a measure of the tempo 
rary fluctuations of federal military expenditures, of its deviation from its long run equilib 
rium path, πt the annual inflation rate calculated on the basis of the consumer price index,
20) 
m3r is the growth rate of real money M3, and gnpr the growth rate of real GNP.  
Theory predicts that cyclical fluctuations in output which are caused by an economic boom 
and/or a recession have a significant impact on the budget deficit: the deficit increases when 
the output gap is negative, i.e., when it lies below its ‘normal’ level.
21) The Swiss economy 
did experience cyclical fluctuations in the considered post war period: the negative output gap 
was several times below the 2 percent level.
22) Following the previous literature, we examine 
the hypothesis by testing the effect of the output gap which is defined as a difference between 
the real GNP and the trend of the real GNP.
23) The coefficient of the output gap variable in 
model (22) is suggested to be close to one.  
As is shown in Figure 1, a significant determinant of the budget deficit is a temporary in 
crease in public expenditures during wartime. As shown by BARRO (1979, 1989) and SA 
HAKASUL (1986), such fluctuations are caused by an increase in federal military expenditures 
during wartime. Accordingly, we test this hypothesis by examining the effect of temporary 
fluctuations in military expenditures on the budget deficit.
24) The theory predicts that the es 
                                                           
 18.  See, e.g., BARRO (1979, 1986), SAHASAKUL (1986) and BOHN (1998, 2004).  
 19.  See BARRO (1979) and BOHN (1998, 2004).  
 20.  The change in the consumer price index is stationary at levels. The computed ADF test statistic is  5.856 
(with 1 lag).  
 21.  See BARRO (1979, 1986).  
 22.  See BUNDESRAT (2000, p.4673). 
 23.  To calculate the trend in real GNP we use the HP filter and set the smoothness parameter λ equal to 100.  
 24.  Since the federal military expenditures are non stationary in the second sub period, we calculate their fluc 
tuations as a difference between the real military expenditures and the estimated trend of real military ex 
penditures which is computed by using the HP filter (all variables are used in the natural logarithms). – 20 – 
 
timated coefficient may be close to one if an increase in expenditures above the ‘normal’ level 
does not cause either a significant change in civil expenditures or an unusual tax increase.
25)  
The intertemporal budget constraint links the budget deficit and the public debt. BOHN (1998, 
2004) defines the budget deficit as sustainable if it responds negatively to an increase in pub 
lic debt. In order to improve the intertemporal budget balance, the government should com 
pensate an increase in public debt by reducing the non interest expenditures and/or by in 
creasing taxes.  
BARRO (1979, 1986) assumes that the budget deficit is also a linear function of the expected 
inflation rate. To test this hypothesis, we follow the methodology of JORDAN, KUGLER, LENZ, 
and SAVIOZ (2002) and, using 30 observations, we calculate the expected inflation by out of 
sample forecasts with rolling estimation of the equation (23).
26) The predicted coefficient on 
the expected inflation rate in the budget deficit equation is suggested to be close to one.  
Using OLS, the results for the deficit equation (21) over the entire sample from 1930 to 2002 
are as follows:
27) 
(23)  Dt   =  0.006  + 0.113 
e
t π   +  0.028 TDt  –  0.014 RGNPt  +  0.038 RMGt   
    (0.14)  (0.56)  (1.36)  ( 0.25)  (3.20) 
  +  0.589 Dt 1  +   t ˆ ε , 
  (3.86) 
  SER  =  0.009,   R
2  =  0.852,   D. W.  =  1.496,   J. B.  =  0.527. 
The results for the sub period from 1946 to 2002 are given by 
(24)  Dt   =   –  0.001  + 0.661 
e
t π   +  0.020 TDt  –  0.051 RGNPt  + 0.015 RMGt   
    ( 0.66)  (2.55)  (1.70)  ( 1.58)  (1.86) 
  +  0.335 Dt 1  +   t ˆ ε , 
  (1.96) 
  SER  =  0.007,   R
2  =  0.380,   D. W.  =  1.653,   J. B.  =  0.197. 
The coefficient of total federal debt is in both equations positive, i.e. it has the ‘wrong’ sign. 
Moreover, for the period after World War II it is even significant at the 10 percent level. This 
causes doubts on the sustainability of deferral fiscal policy. The output gap has the expected 
negative impact on the public deficit, but its impact is neither for the entire sample nor for the 
                                                           
 25.  See BARRO (1979, 1989).  
 26.  See JORDAN, KUGLER, LENZ, and SAVIOZ (2002) for Swiss inflation forecasts by using a VAR Models. See 
also BALTENSPERGER, JORDAN and SAVIOZ (2001) who show that M3 is a relevant indicator of future infla 
tion in Switzerland. See for this also DUEKER and FISCHER (1996). 
 27.  The numbers in parentheses are the t statistics of the estimated coefficient, SER is the standard error of the 
regression, D. W. is the Durbin Watson statistics, and J. B. the Jarque Bera statistics. We use Newey West 
estimates for the standard errors to correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. – The available data 
allows us to compute the expected inflation only for the period from 1930 to 2002.  – 21 – 
 
period after World War II significant. Contrary to this, military expenditure do have a signifi 
cant impact, at the 1 percent level for the entire period and still at the 10 percent level for the 
second sub period. However, its estimated coefficient is far away from the theoretically ex 
pected value of one, indicating that civilian expenditure have been reduced and/or taxes in 
creased to finance part of the additional military expenditure during the wars. Finally, the ex 
pected inflation rate is insignificant for the whole period, but significant for the second one, 
with a coefficient which is considerably below but statistically not different from one. 
5  Concluding Remarks 
This study asks whether fiscal policy of the Swiss federation is sustainable. We consider the 
period from 1900 to 2000, but – allowing for a structural break in relation to World War II – 
also for the two sub periods from 1900 to 1939 and from 1946 to 2002. Using annual data, we 
perform several unit root and stationarity tests as well as tests for co integration between the 
revenue  and expenditure GNP ratios. All tests provide more or less the same picture which 
is, however, in itself contradictory. Considering the whole period, the estimated results sug 
gest that the federal fiscal policy is sustainable, the budget deficit is consistent with the in 
tertemporal budget constraint. Revenue  and expenditure GNP ratios are, e.g., cointegrated 
with a cointegrating vector close to [1  1]. If we consider the two sub periods separately, we 
get, however, quite different results: Swiss fiscal policy does not seem to be sustainable in 
either of the two periods; there is at best evidence for weak sustainability in the period after 
World War II. 
The question is how to interpret this puzzle. It can hardly be caused by the structural break in 
relation to World War II, as in this case the opposite result should occur: sustainability for the 
two sub periods but no evidence for sustainability over the whole period. An alternative, but 
also hardly satisfactory explanation might be that the power of the unit root and cointegration 
tests is too low to reject the null hypotheses in the sub periods but it might be sufficient to 
reject them if we consider the whole period.  
If we look at the more recent development as shown in Figures 1 and 2, another explanation 
might be more convincing: even in historical perspective, the large deficits in the federal 
budget outside war times arose in the last thirty and especially in the last fifteen years. This 
results in a more or less steady increase of the federal debt since 1975. Thus, even if fiscal 
policy was sustainable up to the mid seventies of the last century, it might be no longer sus 
tainable in the most recent past. If we consider the whole period compared with the war time 
deficits, these more recent deficits do not seem to be very large, but considering the situation 
in peace times they are. This was also the conviction of the Swiss citizens when they accepted 
the introduction of a debt brake at the federal level in 2001. Such debt breaks have been 
proved to be quite effective in some Swiss cantons like St. Gall and Fribourg, where they – 22 – 
 
were introduced several decades ago,
28) and the hope is that this institution will bring back 
federal fiscal policy on a sustainable path. 
References 
AHMED, S., and J. ROGERS (1995), Government budget deficits and trade deficits. Are present value 
constraints satisfied in long term data?, Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 351 – 374. 
ANDREWS, D. (1993), Tests for parameter instability and structural change with unknown 
change point, Econometrica 61 821 – 856. 
AUERBACH A., J. GOCKALE and L. KOTLIKOFF (1991), Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alterna 
tive to Deficit Accounting, in: D. BRADFORD (ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 5, MIT 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1991, 55 – 110. 
AUERBACH A., J. GOCKALE and L. KOTLIKOFF (1992), Generational Accounting: A New Approach to 
Understanding the Effects of Fiscal Policy on Saving, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94, 303 
– 319. 
BALTENSPERGER, E., T. JORDAN and M. SAVIOZ (2001), The Demand for M3 and Inflation Forecasts; 
An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 137, 244 – 272. 
BARRO, R. J. (1979), On the Determination of the Public Debt, Journal of Political Economy 87, 940 – 
971. 
BARRO, R. J. (1986), U. S. Deficits Since World War I, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88, 195 – 
222. 
BLANCHARD, O.J., J. CHOURAQUI, R. HAGEMANN and N. SARTOR (1990), The sustainability of fiscal 
policy: New Answers to an old question, OECD Economic studies 15, 7 – 36.  
BLANCHARD, O.J. (1993), Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators, in: H. VERBON and F. VAN 
WINDEN (eds.), The Political Economy of Government Debt, North Holland, Amsterdam 1993, 307 
– 325. 
BOHN, H. (1998), The Behaviour of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
113, 949 – 963. 
BOHN, H. (2004), The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in the United States, Paper presented at the CES 
ifo/LBI Conference on the Sustainability of Public Debt, Tutzing, October 22 – 23, 2004. 
BORGMAN C., und E. RAFFELHÜSCHEN (2004), Zur Entwicklung der Nachhaltigkeit der schweizeri-
schen Fiskal- und Sozialpolitik: Generationenbilanzen 1995 – 2001, Staatssekretariat für Wirt 
schaft, Bern 2004. 
BUNDESRAT (2000), Botschaft zur Schuldenbremse vom 5. Juli 2000, BBl 2000 1318, 4653 – 4726. 
BUNDESRAT (2001), Zusatzbericht zur Botschaft zur Schuldenbremse vom 10. Januar 2001, BBl 2001  
0022, 2387 – 2420. 
DANNINGER, S. (2002), A New Rule: The Swiss Debt Brake, International Monetary Fund, Work 
ing Paper No. 02/18, January 2002. 
DOMAR, E. D. (1944), The Burden of the Debt and the National Income, The American Economic 
Review 34, 798 – 827. 
                                                           
 28.  See FELD and KIRCHGÄSSNER (2004). – 23 – 
 
DUEKER, M., and A. FISCHER (1996), Inflation targeting in a small open economy: empirical results 
for Switzerland, Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 89 – 103 
EIDGENÖSSISCHES FINANZDEPARTMENT (2001), Die Schuldenbremse: Dokumentation, Bern, 2
nd edi 
tion, September 2001. 
ENGLE, R. F., and C. W. J. GRANGER (1987), "Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing", Econometrica 55, 251 – 276. 
FELD L.P. and G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2004), On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss Experi 
ence, Paper presented at the CESifo/LBI Conference on the Sustainability of Public Debt, Tutzing, 
October 22 – 23, 2004. 
GREGORY, A. W., and B. E. HANSEN (1996), Residual based test for co integration in models with 
regime shifts, Journal of Econometrics 70, 99 – 126. 
HAKKIO, C. S., and M. RUSH (1991), Is the Budget Deficit Too Large?, Economic Inquiry, 29, 429 – 
445. 
HAMILTON, J., and M. FLAVIN (1986), On the limitations of government borrowing: A framework for 
empirical testing, American Economic Review 76, 808 – 19. 
HAUG A. (1995), Has Federal Budget Deficit Policy Changed in Recent Years?, Economic Inquiry 33, 
104 – 118. 
JOHANSEN, S. (1988), Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors, Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control, 12, 231 – 254. 
JORDAN, T., KUGLER, P., LENZ, C. und SAVIOZ, M., Inflationsprognosen mit Vektorautoregressiven 
Modellen, Quartalsheft der Schweizerischen Nationalbank 1/2002, 41 – 66. 
KIRCHGÄSSNER G. (2005), Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Federal State: The Swiss Example, Swiss 
Political Science Review 11, 19 – 46. 
KOMMISSION FÜR KONJUNKTURFRAGEN (2004), Nachhaltigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen, Jahresbe-
richt 2004, 383. Mitteilung, Beilage zur Volkswirtschaft, dem Magazin für Wirtschaftspolitik, Sep 
tember 2004. 
KREMERS, J. (1988), The long run limits of the U.S. federal debt, Economics Letters 28, 259 – 262.  
KREMERS, J. (1989), U.S. Federal Indebtedness and the conduct of fiscal policy, Journal of Monetary 
economics 23, 219 – 238. 
KWIATKOWSKI, D., P. C. B. PHILLIPS, P. SCHMIDT and Y. SHIN, Testing the Null Hypothesis of Sta 
tionarity Against the Alternative of a Unit Root, Journal of Econometrics 54, pp. 159 – 178. 
MACDONALD, R. (1992), Some Tests of the government's intertemporal budget constraint using U.S. 
data, Applied Economics 24, 1287 – 1292.  
MACKINNON, J. G. (1991), Critical Values for Co integration Tests in R. F. ENGLE and C. W. J. 
GRANGER (eds.), Long-Run Economic Relationships, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 267 – 276. 
MARTIN, G. M. (2000), US Deficit Sustainability: a New Approach Based on Multiple Endogenous 
Breaks, Journal of Applied Econometrics 15, 83 – 105. 
MÜLLER, U.K. (2005), Size and power of tests of stationarity in highly autocorrelated time series, 
Journal of Econometrics 128, 195 – 213. 
OECD (2002), Fiscal Sustainability: The Contribution of Fiscal Rules, OECD Economic Outlook 72, 
December. 
OSTERWALD LENUM, M. (1992), A note with fractiles of the asymptotic distribution of the maximum 
likelihood cointegration rank test statistics: four cases, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
54, 461 – 472. – 24 – 
 
QUINTOS, C. E. (1995), Sustainability of the Deficit Process with Structural Shifts, Journal of Business 
and Economic Statistics 13(4), October, 409 – 417. 
PERRON, P. (1989), The great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis, Econometrica 57 
(6), 1361 – 1401. 
SAHASAKUL, C. (1986), The U.S. evidence on optimal taxation over time, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 18, 251 – 275.  
STOCK J.H. and M.W. WATSON (1993), A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in Hig 
her Order Integrated Systems, Econometrica 61, 783 – 820. 
TREHAN, B., and C. E. WALSH (1988), Common Trends, Intertemporal Budget Balance, and Revenue 
Smoothing, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 12, 425 – 444. 
TREHAN, B., and C. WALSH (1991), Testing intertemporal budget constraints: Theory and applications 
to the US federal budget and current account deficit, Journal of Money Credit and Banking 23, 206 
– 23. 
WILCOX, D. (1989), The sustainability of government deficits: Implications of the present value con 
straint, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 21, 291 – 306. 
Appendix: Data and Sources 
•  Federal revenues 
•  Federal expenditures 
•  Federal public debt 
Sources:  Historical Statistics of Switzerland, several issues of the Statistical Yearbook 
of Switzerland, and Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
•  Real Gross National Product (GNP) 
•  GNP deflator 
Sources:  Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
•  Consumer price index 
Sources:  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FELIX ANDRIST  
•  Real monetary aggregate M3 
Sources:  Historical Statistics of Switzerland, and Swiss National Bank 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1629 Torberg Falch and Bjarne Strøm, Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public 
Sector, December 2005 
 
1630 Hartmut Egger, Peter Egger, Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann, International 
Capital Market Integration, Educational Choice and Economic Growth, December 2005 
 
1631 Alexander Haupt, The Evolution of Public Spending on Higher Education in a 
Democracy, December 2005 
 
1632 Alessandro Cigno, The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation, December 
2005 
 
1633 Michiel Evers, Ruud A. de Mooij and Daniel J. van Vuuren, What Explains the 
Variation in Estimates of Labour Supply Elasticities?, December 2005 
 
1634 Matthias Wrede, Health Values, Preference Inconsistency, and Insurance Demand, 
December 2005 
 
1635 Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup, Do Consumers Buy 
Less of a Taxed Good?, December 2005 
 
1636 Michael McBride and Stergios Skaperdas, Explaining Conflict in Low-Income 
Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future, December 2005 
 
1637 Alfons J. Weichenrieder and Oliver Busch, Artificial Time Inconsistency as a Remedy 
for the Race to the Bottom, December 2005 
 
1638 Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher Waller, Optimal Stabilization Policy with 
Flexible Prices, December 2005 
 
1639 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Violent Groups and Police Tactics: Should Tear Gas 
Make Crime Preventers Cry?, December 2005 
 
1640 Yin-Wong Cheung and Kon S. Lai, A Reappraisal of the Border Effect on Relative 
Price Volatility, January 2006 
 
1641 Stefan Bach, Giacomo Corneo and Viktor Steiner, Top Incomes and Top Taxes in 
Germany, January 2006 
 
1642 Johann K. Brunner and Susanne Pech, Optimum Taxation of Life Annuities, January 
2006 
 
1643 Naércio Aquino Menezes Filho, Marc-Andreas Muendler and Garey Ramey, The 
Structure of Worker Compensation in Brazil, with a Comparison to France and the 
United States, January 2006  
1644 Konstantinos Angelopoulos, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Vanghelis Vassilatos, Rent-
Seeking Competition from State Coffers: A Calibrated DSGE Model of the Euro Area, 
January 2006 
 
1645 Burkhard Heer and Bernd Suessmuth, The Savings-Inflation Puzzle, January 2006 
 
1646 J. Stephen Ferris, Soo-Bin Park and Stanley L. Winer, Political Competition and 
Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the 
Size of Government, January 2006 
 
1647 Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Kadri Männasoo, Extracting Leading Indicators of 
Bank Fragility from Market Prices – Estonia Focus, January 2006 
 
1648 Panu Poutvaara, On Human Capital Formation with Exit Options: Comment and New 
Results, January 2006 
 
1649 Anders Forslund, Nils Gottfries and Andreas Westermark, Real and Nominal Wage 
Adjustment in Open Economies, January 2006 
 
1650 M. Hashem Pesaran, Davide Pettenuzzo and Allan G. Timmermann, Learning, 
Structural Instability and Present Value Calculations, January 2006 
 
1651 Markku Lanne and Helmut Luetkepohl, Structural Vector Autoregressions with 
Nonnormal Residuals, January 2006 
 
1652 Helge Berger, Jakob de Haan and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Does Money Matter in the ECB 
Strategy? New Evidence Based on ECB Communication, January 2006 
 
1653 Axel Dreher and Friedrich Schneider, Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An 
Empirical Analysis, January 2006 
 
1654 Stefan Brandauer and Florian Englmaier, A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests 
between Groups, January 2006 
 
1655 Jan Zápal and Ondřej Schneider, What are their Words Worth? Political Plans and 
Economic Pains of Fiscal Consolidations in New EU Member States, January 2006 
 
1656 Thiess Buettner, Sebastian Hauptmeier and Robert Schwager, Efficient Revenue 
Sharing and Upper Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany, January 
2006 
 
1657 Daniel Haile, Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Harrie A. A. Verbon, Cross-Racial Envy and 
Underinvestment in South Africa, February 2006 
 
1658 Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume, Outsourcing in Contests, February 2006 
 
1659 M. Hashem Pesaran and Ron Smith, Macroeconometric Modelling with a Global 
Perspective, February 2006 
 
  
1660 Alexander F. Wagner and Friedrich Schneider, Satisfaction with Democracy and the 
Environment in Western Europe – a Panel Analysis, February 2006 
 
1661 Ben J. Heijdra and Jenny E. Ligthart, Fiscal Policy, Monopolistic Competition, and 
Finite Lives, February 2006 
 
1662 Ludger Woessmann, Public-Private Partnership and Schooling Outcomes across 
Countries, February 2006 
 
1663 Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara, Political Parties and Network Formation, February 
2006 
 
1664 Alessandro Cigno and Annalisa Luporini, Optimal Policy Towards Families with 
Different Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and 
Stochastic Fertility, February 2006 
 
1665 Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter, Regional Effects on Employer Provided 
Training: Evidence from Apprenticeship Training in Switzerland, February 2006 
 
1666 Laszlo Goerke, Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion, February 2006 
 
1667 Ivo J. M. Arnold and Jan J. G. Lemmen, Inflation Expectations and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Eurozone: Evidence from Survey Data, February 2006 
 
1668 Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller, Voice and Bargaining Power, February 2006 
 
1669 Françoise Forges and Frédéric Koessler, Long Persuasion Games, February 2006 
 
1670 Florian Englmaier and Markus Reisinger, Information, Coordination, and the 
Industrialization of Countries, February 2006 
 
1671 Hendrik Hakenes and Andreas Irmen, Something out of Nothing? Neoclassical Growth 
and the ‘Trivial’ Steady State, February 2006 
 
1672 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Democracy and Development: The Devil in the 
Details, February 2006 
 
1673 Michael Rauber and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle 
Analysis of German Academic Economists, February 2006 
 
1674 Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden, Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators 
Know each other, February 2006 
 
1675 Assar Lindbeck and Mats Persson, A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms, 
February 2006 
 
1676 Horst Raff, Michael Ryan and Frank Staehler, Asset Ownership and Foreign-Market 
Entry, February 2006 
 
  
1677 Miguel Portela, Rob Alessie and Coen Teulings, Measurement Error in Education and 
Growth Regressions, February 2006 
 
1678 Andreas Haufler, Alexander Klemm and Guttorm Schjelderup, Globalisation and the 
Mix of Wage and Profit Taxes, February 2006 
 
1679 Kurt R. Brekke and Lars Sørgard, Public versus Private Health Care in a National 
Health Service, March 2006 
 
1680 Dominik Grafenhofer, Christian Jaag, Christian Keuschnigg and Mirela Keuschnigg, 
Probabilistic Aging, March 2006 
 
1681 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Persistence of Innovation in Dutch Manufacturing: Is it Spurious?, March 2006 
 
1682 Andrea Colciago, V. Anton Muscatelli, Tiziano Ropele and Patrizio Tirelli, The Role of 
Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: Are National Automatic Stabilizers Effective?, 
March 2006 
 
1683 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Risk Selection in Natural Disaster 
Insurance – the Case of France, March 2006 
 
1684 Ken Sennewald and Klaus Waelde, “Itô’s Lemma“ and the Bellman Equation for 
Poisson Processes: An Applied View, March 2006 
 
1685 Ernesto Reuben and Frans van Winden, Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of 
Emotions and Fairness Norms, March 2006 
 
1686 Françoise Forges, The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies 
with and without Indivisibilities, March 2006 
 
1687 Assar Lindbeck, Mårten Palme and Mats Persson, Job Security and Work Absence: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, March 2006 
 
1688 Sebastian Buhai and Coen Teulings, Tenure Profiles and Efficient Separation in a 
Stochastic Productivity Model, March 2006 
 
1689 Gebhard Kirchgaessner and Silika Prohl, Sustainability of Swiss Fiscal Policy, March 
2006 